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Abstract
Government often has been maligned as a source of funding for innovative
research

due to

stories

of failures

caused

by factors

such

as bureaucratic

micromanagement, overly-restrictive regulation, and lack o f customer focus. While basic
research may be regarded as a public good, and therefore within the domain of
government funding, applied research is often considered best left to the private sector.
One government agency sometimes mentioned as an exception to the rule of government
mismanagement in applied research is the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).
Founded in 1958, ARP A has compiled an impressive list of accomplishments in the
area o f military technology.

Ironically, the agency is known equally well for the

commercial spin-offs of its research, particularly in the area of computer technology.
These commercial successes have led many in Washington, D.C. to believe the agency's
research agenda should be expanded to focus explicitly on "dual-use" technologies, with
the intent of benefiting both the commercial and military sectors simultaneously.
Reflecting this mission expansion, in recent years ARPA also has been viewed as a funding
instrument to prop up America's high-technology industries against foreign competition.
Surprisingly, no study has attempted to quantify ARPA's impact on technology in
relation to its investment. This paper lays the groundwork for such an effort by surveying
the most promising research evaluation methods, reviewing the sources of information
available to support an evaluation, and identifying the potential pitfalls. Through a survey
of articles related to ARPA and a review of a study commissioned by the agency in the
late 1980s, the paper identifies factors potentially responsible for ARPA's well-known list
o f achievements. Finally, the study warns that ARPA's recent direction may have taken it
off the trail-blazing path it once traveled.
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2

In tro d u ctio n

Many have maligned government agencies as a source of funding for technology,
arguing that government projects are all too often driven by concerns other than
efficiency, effectiveness, or public welfare. The historical failures of government attempts
to manage technology are well documented (Squires 1984; Eads and Nelson 1971;
Griliches 1987).

A particularly interesting example is provided by George Eads and

Richard Nelson.

They studied the commercial airline industry after World War II and

found that, by 1970, 80 percent of the world's commercial airline fleet was built in the
United States.

This happened even though U.S. manufacturers had to fund their own

research and development, while the British government paid for up to fifty percent of the
development costs of new aircraft and required their own airlines to buy them. In another
study, Zvi Griliches examined trends in productivity for a sample o f 652 manufacturing
firms and found that, over the 1967-1977 time period, the greater the proportion of total
research funded by the companies, rather than the government, the greater the valueadded of that research (Griliches 1987).
Critics o f government-funded research and development (R&D) argue that
government failures demonstrate the need to leave technological funding to the private
sector, where the potential benefits o f investments in new technology are likely to be
weighed more carefully against the costs and risks involved.
A primary obstacle to efficient government funding is, o f course, the everexpanding

bureaucracy

which

seems

so

prevalent

in

government

institutions.

Understanding this phenomenon o f constant expansion of the government and its agencies
requires a review o f Buchanan and Tullock's theory o f Public Choice (1962). Political
theorists often assume the individual working in the public sector acts not in his or her
own self-interest, but in the public interest. Indeed, proponents of socialism rely on the
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idea that personal motives for private gain can be replaced by the motivation to serve the
social good.
At the very foundation of democracy, however, is the reliance upon competition
among individual actors in the economy, all of whom operate under the same set of
constraining laws. In the democratic system, therefore, the concept of individuals acting
in their own self interests is crucial to the operation of economic markets.

Is it then

reasonable to expect people to act in their own self-interests in their private-sector
transactions, but in the interest o f the so-called "public good" when employed by the
government? Buchanan and Tullock and the adherents to the theory of Public Choice do
not think so. They argue that those working for the government will pursue their selfinterests in both their public and private lives. Buchanan and Tullock further argue that no
clear-cut definition of the "public good" exists in the first place. Because people rarely
agree on what constitutes this nebulous public good, the assertion that the majority of
politicians strive for such a goal is rather meaningless (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
One way for politicians to act in their own self-interests is to garner publicity for
themselves as they champion causes which are disproportionately beneficial to their own
constituencies. In so doing, they hope to secure the loyalty, in the form of reelection
votes, of an admiring constituency. Obviously, if all politicians voted independently, only
the rare issue o f apparent benefit to the majority of the country would receive enough
support to become law, as each legislator would vote in favor of only those issues
beneficial to his or her own constituency. In reality, however, legislators form coalitions
and engage in a ritual o f quid pro quo which ensures that most, if not all o f them, are able
to amass a treasure chest of pork for their respective constituencies. This, incidentally,
provides a partial explanation for the staying power, or apparent advantage enjoyed by
incumbents, as well as the Herculean effort required to decrease the federal budget.
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Cutting an item out o f the budget may risk the crumbling o f coalitions, the future
withdrawal of support for budget items favored by other legislators, and "hell to pay" at
the ballot box. Justifying their own pet programs while blaming the rest o f the Congress
for not balancing the budget is, unfortunately, a much safer option for most politicians.
One government agency sometimes mentioned as an exception to the rule of
government mismanagement is the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA),
previously known as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
Edward E. David Jr., President Nixon's science advisor and a former Bell Laboratories
executive, claims, "Among all the outfits that dispense public money, this one has
produced the most" (Perry 1991, 65). Interestingly, the innovations for which ARPA is
best known are the commercial applications o f its research and development, often
referred to as "spin-offs" (Brown and Wilson 1993). ARPA is most famous for its role in
the development o f the computer industry and as the sponsor o f many important
innovations in that industry. The agency has made its mark with such developments as
automatic teller machines (ATM), computer graphics, the Internet (formerly the
ARPANET), supercomputers, Artificial Intelligence (AI), expert systems, parallel
processing, and even the computer "mouse" (Flamm 1987; Kitfield 1990).

In addition to

spinning off computer technology, ARPA has spun off entire companies, such as Silicon
Graphics, Sun Microsystems, and MIPS Computer Systems.

In an article about

commercial spin-offs from defense spending, one writer for Fortune magazine even
proposed that ARPA "may have done more for U.S. competitiveness than any other
organization" (Perry 1991, 65). Ironically, ARPA probably is known less for its equallyimpressive list o f military accomplishments, which include "stealth" technology and "smart
weapons," the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the National Aerospace Plane (NASP),
night vision goggles, advanced sensing devices, and a myriad of other military advances.
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With such an impressive list o f successes the question then begs to be asked, has ARPA
proven itself to be significantly more efficient at funding technology than other agencies?
If ARPA has been more successful at funding technology than other government agencies,
then we might endeavor to identify and explain the reasons for ARPA's success, and
thereby provide criteria for future government funding of scientific research.
Chapter 1 provides a brief history o f government funding o f scientific research, and
traces the roots o f pork barrel spending in the area o f science funding. Chapter 2 reviews
some of the common approaches to evaluating research and development, with an
emphasis on those techniques most likely to apply to ARPA. Chapter 3 provides a brief
review o f ARPA's history. Chapter 4 addresses the problem of evaluating the agency's
success and discusses the most comprehensive study on ARPA to date.

Though no

definitive answers exist, and detailed analysis is lacking, available evidence suggests the
conclusion that ARPA has enjoyed greater-than-normal success in funding technology.
Chapter 5 identifies some of the explanatory factors in ARPA's record of success, while
Chapter 6 highlights some disturbing trends and concludes with a word o f caution
concerning the future o f the agency.
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Chapter 1: A Brief History of Government-Funded Research
Large-scale government funding o f research and development began during World
War II.

Prior to that time, the Department of Agriculture had administered research

funds, but few other agencies had played a major role in funding research. Focused on
military requirements during the war, government-funded research was tremendously
successful at advancing the state-of-the-art in military weaponry. This funding led to the
invention o f radar, sonar, the proximity fuse, and the beginning o f the atomic age.
Government-funded research during this period also paved the way for several health-care
advances, including penicillin and DDT. Focused on these successes, President Roosevelt
and many of the nation's top scientists resolved that the government's role in funding
research should continue (Martino 1992).
Since its inception in 1887, the Department of Agriculture has followed (and still
follows) a set formula o f disbursing research dollars "to assure that each state, and almost
every congressional district, gets its share" (Martino 1992, 21). The department has not
attempted to evaluate individual proposals before doling out its research funds. Instead, it
has distributed its research funds, according to certain formulae, to ensure geographic
equity (Martino 1992; Huffman and Evenson 1993). Ironically, economic analyses have
found that the rates of return on agricultural research "have exceeded the normal rates of
return on investment in the economy" (Schultz 1981, 105).

One explanation for this

success is that, because optimal agricultural practices differ across different regions and
climates, distributing research funds geographically may be the best approach.

Such a

method is not, however, likely to be very efficient in those areas o f scientific research
which are not geographically dependent.
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Post-WWII agencies chose not to follow the Agriculture Department's example,
but instead distributed research funds on the basis of peer review. Researchers submitted
proposals to the respective agencies and a peer review panel decided which proposals
were most worthy of funding. This system contradicted the desires of Vannevar Bush, the
head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during the post-war Roosevelt
administration. Bush advocated a system by which all government research grants would
be administered by a single government agency, the National Science Foundation.
Fortunately, the fact that research ended up being funded by multiple agencies probably
helped prevent pork-barreling for a long while.

Since the numerous agencies had to

compete for proposals from top scientists, they had to earn good reputations (Martino
1992).
According to Joseph Martino, pork-barreling in science funding really did not
become prevalent until 1983, when Washington lobbying firm Cassidy and Associates
obtained direct appropriations for labs at Columbia University and Catholic University.
Congress directed the Department o f Energy (DOE) to spend the money without even
asking the DOE, or anyone else in the scientific community, whether the project had any
merit. Martino goes on to explain:
In 1983 and 1984 together, Congress appropriated $100 million for
laboratories and research projects solely on the basis of lobbying by the
recipients. There were neither requests by the government agencies
directed to spend the money nor congressional hearings on any o f these
appropriations (1992, 2-3).
In 1985, this trend continued as Congress, without any hearings, ordered the DOE to
spend $56.5 million for projects at nine universities. After the Department o f Defense
(DOD) established the University Research Initiative to sponsor defense-oriented research
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at universities, Congress directed which universities would receive the funds.

Within

seven years, annual pork-barrel appropriations for science grew from a few million to a
quarter o f a billion dollars (Martino 1992).
Obviously, pork barrel spending is a suspect in some of the failures o f governmentfunded research over the past decade, but what about the decades and even centuries
prior? If Martino is correct in his assertion that pork barrel spending in the area o f science
funding is a rather recent occurrence, then some other factor must be responsible.

In

general, those who criticize government funding of science refer to government funding
and targeting civilian technologies.

Actually, the federal government has faired pretty

well at funding military technology. The dominance o f the American military machine and
the desirability of American military hardware bears witness to this success. Instances of
government failures have occurred when the government has decided that the market has
overlooked a great opportunity and that it needs to push ahead in technological areas
which the private sector has avoided.

The lack of commercial investment in military

R&D, which is explained in Chapter 3: History o f ARPA, creates rich opportunities for
ground-breaking research by government agencies. In the private sector, with a multitude
o f buyers and sellers, if no one is willing to invest in a particular area o f applied research,
the reason can be presumed to be an insufficient expected reward for the level o f risk
involved. If so, the phenomenon o f government agencies experiencing failure in these
areas should come as no surprise.
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Chapter 2: Evaluating Research and Development
Government research managers are interested in determining the value of
the research they support for at least two reasons: to help them improve
the management of their programs, and to demonstrate to their
bureaucratic superiors, to Congress, and to agency clientele groups that
their programs have produced benefits that justify their cost (Roessner
1993, 192).
Evaluating Research and Development efforts is almost always a touchy subject.
Dr. Alain Barbarie, in his essay on the evaluation o f Canadian R&D (1993), identifies
three primary difficulties in performing such evaluations. First, those outside the scientific
community are justifiably uncomfortable with evaluating the work performed by scientists.
Those in the position to make decisions regarding the fate of research organizations often
are not scientists themselves, and may feel unqualified to pass judgment.

Second,

scientific research is very difficult to evaluate in terms o f a traditional cost-benefit analysis,
due to the fact that the results o f scientific research may not be seen for many years. Also,
the impact o f a single research project may not be identifiable, as it combines with many
other research projects to impact an innovation. Third, scientists themselves often resist
the evaluations. As Dr. Barbarie explains,
The scientific community in the Federal Government tends to be reluctant
to have R&D work evaluated by any criteria other than those of quality of
research. Preservation o f the status quo is obviously a strong incentive;
however, many deeply believe that science, if done well, is always
worthwhile and that outsiders have neither the right nor the necessary
qualifications to question it (1993, 156).
Incidentally, the reluctance to evaluate R&D on other criteria is not peculiar to the public
sector. In a recent article, Bell Laboratories' scientist and Nobel laureate Amo Penzias
recounts a story of how researchers at his company were encouraged by management
(who, at Bell Labs, are also researchers) to build the world's most powerful laser diode.
They succeeded in doing this and for their efforts received much praise, including the "best
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paper" award at a professional conference, but they failed to meet the customer
requirement for a producible and usable laser diode. These scientists failed to consider
the customer's criteria for success. Evaluated from the customer's perspective, this effort
would be regarded as a failure, yet the scientists considered it a rousing success. Penzias
acknowledges the scientific value o f producing a record-breaking laser, but ponders
whether a much more valuable product might have resulted had the researchers included
compatibility with existing fabrication methods and other customer requirements as
constraints in their optimization effort (1995).
Despite these difficulties, evaluation of government-funded R&D has become a hot
topic around the world. As a result of conferences sponsored by the Commission of the
European Communities in the 1970s and 1980s, all European Community research
projects were evaluated regularly by the mid-1980s.

Japan also became serious about

research evaluation in the early 1980s, and in fact commissioned the Asahi Research
Center to survey the techniques in use throughout the world. Though the United States
has been less enthusiastic about pursuing formal evaluation programs, the U.S. Congress
has pushed for them, and the Office o f Naval Research (ONR) has led the way in
establishing such programs (Cozzens 1993). The benefit of establishing a formal review
process is that reviews can be conducted on research in progress to identify any
weaknesses to the program managers and allow them to make adjustments before going
too far in the wrong direction.. The reviews also might be useful in evaluating the overall
success of federal agencies and identifying common traits of successful programs. A
multitude o f evaluation approaches are available, but four o f the most pertinent to ARPA
are ratio models, economic models, bibliometrics, and peer review.

11

1. Ratio Models
Ratio models are the most common method of evaluating the return on research
and development programs.

This is often done by expressing the outputs o f an R&D

program as a ratio to the R&D inputs used to produce them. Some of the ratios are based
on subjective estimates. For instance, one might estimate the ratio o f the net future value
o f stealth technology (a DARPA product) to the funds spent to develop that technology.
Since most new military aircraft programs will likely incorporate signature reduction, or
stealth, to some degree, such an estimation would require estimating the value o f stealth to
all the unknown implementations in the future. This would resemble an approach used by
Alcoa, which prepares estimates o f the impact on sales revenues and cost savings o f each
technological breakthrough resulting from its R&D expenditures (Link 1993).

These

impacts are then discounted to present values and added together, and the sum is divided
by Alcoa's total R&D expenditures to provide a measure o f the overall return on R&D.
The credibility o f the resulting ratio depends, o f course, on the accuracy o f the impact
forecasts and the assumed discount rates.
Other ratios are based on objectively-measured quantities.

As an example, an

appropriate quantitative ratio might be the number o f weapon system innovations (new
weapon systems, improvements to existing systems, or innovative ways o f employing
existing systems) divided by the agency's total budget.

Though appealing for their

simplicity, ratio models have several weaknesses. First, a problem common to all ratio
models is the question o f when to calculate the ratio. Because outputs may occur over
many years, if the evaluation fails to consider outputs far enough into the future, it will
underestimate the true ratio. Second, ratios can reward quantity at the expense o f quality.
For example, if an agency's success is judged by a ratio o f the number o f innovations to
the agency's budget, its researchers will have incentive to produce marginal innovations in
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great quantity rather than a few revolutionary innovations. Simply counting the number of
innovations would not account for the value o f each one. Finally, a ratio o f outputs to
R&D expenditures is flawed because R&D is only one o f the inputs used to produce a
given set of outputs.

The profit from the sale of an automobile, for example, is due

partially to the R&D investment, but is also due to the labor and capital inputs. This
factor leads to the potential for overestimation o f the value o f R&D (Link 1993).

2. Economic Models
Another method o f evaluating R&D is through the use o f economic models. This
method includes internal rate o f return (IRR) and net present value (NPV) calculations, as
well as the production function approach. From the field of accounting, 'TRR is defined as
that discount rate which equates the present value o f a project's expected cash inflows to
the present value o f the project's expected costs” (Brigham and Gapenski 1994, 394).

—

-

/=0(1 + IRRY

=

0

t = time period
n = number o f time periods
CFt = cash flow in period t (inflows positive, outflows negative)
IRR is used in financial management as a determinant o f whether or not a proposed
investment is expected to generate a positive net return. A project is pursued only if its
IRR exceeds the expected cost o f capital. Using the IRR approach to evaluate ARPA
research would require estimating the monetary inflows to those organizations or
companies which produce weapon systems using the knowledge gained from particular
ARPA research efforts and solving for the IRR, which equates the present value o f that
stream o f estimated inflows to the present value o f the ARPA investment. One important
caution to consider when comparing IRRs for different projects is that the method can
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lead to unreliable results. Because the projects' net present value profiles1 can cross, the
IRR approach for comparing projects may lead to different answers, depending on the
market interest rate used.
Alternatively, a market interest rate (which is known, in the case of ex-post
evaluations) could be substituted for IRR in the above equation, with the dependent
variable becoming the net present value. Then, the resulting equation could be solved for
NPV:
n

C J7

--<■

npv=y
s

(

i + . * y

k = market interest rate
CFj = cash flow in period t
The benefit o f this calculation, over the IRR approach, is that the NPVs of various
projects can be compared.
Like the ratio models, these approaches also ignore the contribution o f other
inputs (such as labor, capital, management structure, experience, etc.) by the weapon
system producers. A third approach, using production functions, uses time-series data on
capital, labor, and technology inputs to estimate the value o f each input to the total
output.

Q =f ( K , L , T )
Q = quantity or dollar-value of output
K = capital input
L = labor input
T = technology input

1A net present value profile is simply a graphical representation of net present values versus vaiying
interest rates. The rate at which two net present value profiles cross is called the crossover rate. At
interest rates below the crossover rate, one project has the higher NPV, while at interest rates greater than
the crossover rate, the other project has the higher NPV (Brigham and Gapenski 1994).
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Several assumptions must be made regarding the mathematical form of the transformation
equation, but the positive side is that only time-series data on the dollar-value o f output
and the size o f labor, capital, and R&D expenditures are needed to estimate the marginal
contribution o f R&D to the organization's output (Link 1993).
Since such data are often available in the corporate arena, economic models may
be quite useful to the firm. In the case o f federally-funded research, however, a
fundamental problem arises due to the lack of a readily-identifiable and measurable output.
While a firm may limit its concern to the impact on profitability, for instance, the
government must be concerned with the net impact on social welfare o f its funded
research (Stiglitz 1988). Hence, when such an approach is used to evaluate federal R&D
evaluation, the independent variable often must be expressed in such vague terminology as
"net social benefit." A similar approach (in terms of the forecasted variable) involves the
use o f consumer surplus analysis, which relies on an estimation of the future supply and
demand for the commodity to be produced by the government expenditure. As one writer
cautions, however, "with extremely uncertain future demand and supply curves, consumer
surplus analysis, when used in the R&D context, rapidly degenerates into advanced
quantitative guesswork" (Roessner 1993, 194). In ARPA's case, the problem is no less
significant. The dependent variable cannot be expressed in terms of a monetary value.
ARPA's research is not meant to improve profitability or market share, which are clearly
measurable for the private firm, but to enhance the national defense posture, which is
rather difficult to quantify. Due to this difficulty, "the use o f quantitative methods to aid
decisions involving applied research is expected to be more problematic, and limited, in
government than in business" (RoesSner 1993, 183).
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3. Bibliometrics
Bibliometrics is the study and analysis of scientific output using publication-based
data. A common form o f this approach involves citation counts, in which the number of
citations o f a certain research effort serves as a proxy for the importance o f that research.
Because publications are the media through which scientists share ideas, the more an
article is cited, the more likely the research underlying the article has contributed to the
advancement o f knowledge. For this reason, article citations are best used in evaluating
basic research (Melkers 1993). Considering, however, that only about 10 percent2 of its
research is classified as basic research (Agres 1989), article citation is not likely to be the
best approach for evaluating ARPA.
One simple, and related, approach to evaluating the productivity o f an agency
might be simply to count the number o f patents it garners over a given time period. In
theory, since patents serve to establish property rights, the more patents an agency
generates, the more innovations it has produced. Unfortunately, such an approach would
fail to convince critics such as Harvard Professor Manuel Trajtenberg, who writes,
"patents exhibit an enormous variance in their 'importance' or 'value,' and hence, simple
patent counts cannot be very informative o f innovative 'output'" (1990, 172). Instead,
patent counts are merely an indicator of the amount of R&D inputs.

Trajtenberg’s

argument is that any agency, with a large enough staff and enough financial resources, can
generate a collection of patents. Simply counting them, therefore, does not indicate the

quality o f the research funded or performed by the agency.

Trajtenberg elaborates:

2 This 10 percent figure is based on a claim by Agres (1989,40) that basic research at DARPA totaled
about $ 100 million of the agency's $ 1 billion budget. Whether this percentage has remained constant
over time is not clear.
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...the mere counting of patents at any level of aggregation cannot possibly
render good value indicators: simple patent counts assign a value of one to
all patents by construction, whereas their true values exhibit a very large
variance. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence to the effect that the
distribution of patent values is highly skewed toward the low end, with a
long and thin tail into the high-value side (1990, 173).
Griliches echoes this finding, citing European data which reveal that the majority of
patents are of "no or little real value while at the same time a much smaller fraction of
patents is associated with really large economic returns" (Griliches 1987, 31).
A more enlightened approach involves the use of patent citations. When a patent
is issued, accompanying documentation lists a variety of pertinent information, including
citations to previous patents on which the newly patented innovation builds.

These

citations then demonstrate the contribution made by the new patent. In other words, "the
granting o f the patent is a legal statement that the idea embodied in the patent represents a
novel and useful contribution over and above the previous state of knowledge, as
represented by the citations" (Jaffe 1993, 580). The idea behind patent citation analysis is
that, while a patent in itself does not necessarily signify an important innovation, citations
to that patent in other patent applications indicate that it is generating follow-on ideas.
More citations to a given patent, then, indicate relatively greater impact (Melkers 1993).
While this type of research was once too cumbersome to be practical, patent applications
are now available electronically, making the technique more feasible.

Sources of

electronic patent applications include DIALOG and the PATDATA database, available
through BRS (Trajtenberg 1990; Jaffe 1993).
Unfortunately, patent citation analysis is still relatively expensive. The DIALOG
database, though accessible, is also proprietary and costs $90 per hour of access time.
Other sources for patent information include commercial patent research services, such as
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CHI Research, which use their own proprietary databases. These sources exist primarily
to serve the needs of those interested in obtaining new patents, a process which requires
in-depth research into prior patents to determine the incremental contribution o f the new
patent. For those interested in patenting innovations to establish legal property rights, the
cost of citation searches is justifiable as a cost o f doing business.' For academic research,
on the other hand, the costs can be prohibitive.
The home page o f the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)3 will have a
new feature, scheduled to become active on 9 November, 1995, which will provide free
online access to over twenty years o f patent bibliographic text data. According to Mr. Jim
Hirabayashi, in the Information Products Office of the USPTO, the data will come from
the front pages of the patent applications, and will contain such information as the patent
number, issue date, filing date, title, inventor, city, state, assigned owner, patent
classification code, examination information, name o f legal representative, U.S. patents
cited, foreign patents cited, other publications cited, an abstract, and Patent Cooperation
Treaty information.

The search engine is the same one currently used for the AIDS

Patent Database,4 which also is available from the USPTO home page. At this time, the
search engine is not very sophisticated, providing little capability for statistical analysis of
patent citations (see Appendix B).

Another project, led by Adam Jaffe at Harvard and

funded by the NSF, is collecting information from USPTO and creating a database for
researchers, though Hirabayashi did not think it would be available to the public.
Hirabayashi was skeptical that a search o f patents for ARPA or DARPA references
would be successful, because the patent owner is not identified to that level o f detail.
According to Hirabayashi, ARPA patents probably would be listed simply as DOD
patents. Thus, to perform a patent citation search, a list of ARPA's patent numbers or
3 http://www.uspto.gov/
4 http://patents.cnidr.org/welcome.html
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titles would be required. The USPTO does not perform patent citation analyses, and is
therefore unable to provide any specific guidance, but Hirabayashi recommended
researching the work o f Francis Narin, o f CHI Research, who has been very active in the
field.
One caveat in using citation analysis is that it may be biased toward scientists
doing mainstream research (Lindsey 1989). Those operating outside the mainstream are
not likely to be cited very often unless their research produces breakthrough innovations
which influence the mainstream. This is important to consider, because ARPA tends to
work far outside the mainstream, and its innovations are primarily useful in the
development and use o f military weapon systems.5 Unless an ARPA innovation results in
a spin-off, therefore, it may not create a significant number of patent citations.

This

situation would not, however, indicate that the innovation was any less important than
innovations which gamer more patent citations.

This caveat actually is applicable to

evaluations of government labs, in general. According to Papadakis and Bozeman,
because most government labs generate only one or two patents per year, "the substantial
majority of R&D laboratories in the government system do not pass the germaneness or
volume tests which would allow patents to be used meaningfully in R&D evaluation"
(1993, 117).

4. Peer Review
Due to the difficulties and limitations associated with evaluating research using the
previously-identified approaches, about half of the federal research laboratories choose to
evaluate their own research programs with yet another method, peer review (Bozeman
1993). This method involves selecting a team o f experts in the area to be evaluated, and
5 With the exception of its information processing work, which, arguably, has produced breakthrough
innovations.
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bringing them together to review the research effort and evaluate it on several
predetermined criteria. Traditionally, peer review has been used prior to the research, as a
tool for evaluating potential research projects and selecting those to pursue. A common
criticism o f peer review in this context is that it often leads to selection of very
conservative, low-risk projects (Friedman 1981; Squires 1986). One of the reasons for
this is that individual reviewers "evaluate scientific contributions in relation to their own
(very different) cognitive and social locations" (Martin and Irvine 1983, 76). In other
words, reviewers are sometimes reluctant to give a good review to research which
contradicts their own research or thinking. Obviously, low-risk, conservative projects are
incongruous with the very nature of ARPA, so peer review should be used judiciously in
the project-selection process at the agency. As an evaluation tool for completed or in
progress projects, however, peer review may be the most logical choice. According to the
Committee on Federal Laboratories Task Force on Performance Measures for Research
and Development (1975), peer review is the "generally recognized best procedure for
evaluating research and development" (Bozeman 1993, 83).
In addition to the problem mentioned above, peer review evaluation has a couple
o f other drawbacks. First, due to national security considerations, research at ARPA is
extremely sensitive. This situation is similar to that faced by industrial laboratories.
Because research performed by industrial labs is often proprietary, only about 17.5 percent
of them use peer review to evaluate their own research (Bozeman 1993). Companies
spend large sums of money on research to produce new products, and are thus averse to
revealing their research findings to peers from outside their organizations.

Similarly,

ARPA must protect its research findings from foreign governments. Consequently, any
peers selected to review ARPA research would need to possess the requisite security
clearances.

This being said, the security clearance problem is not necessarily a fatal
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stumbling block. Other federal researchers have the necessary clearances, as do many of
the scientists employed by defense contractors.6
The second problem is actually more serious.

Studies of Canadian R&D

evaluations have revealed that those conducted prior to the 1980's generally served the
interests of the researchers, not upper management. As a result, any research considered
to be of good scientific quality was considered a success regardless of the outcome.
Addressing this situation, in 1986, the Office of the Comptroller General of Canada
(OCG) produced a Discussion Paper entitled Evaluations o f Research and Development

Programs, which specified the issues to consider in such evaluations. As a result of this
paper, in the late 1980s, Canadian government evaluations began to ask such questions as:
Do the research activities undertaken constitute a legitimate role for
government at this time? Do the conditions that gave rise to the program
still prevail? Are the objectives consistent with the current government
policy priorities and goals? . . . Does the R&D program have a clearly
defined clientele? To what extent are the clients satisfied that the R&D
program is producing or is likely to produce results which will be useful to
them? (Barbarie 1993, 158-9).
Questions such as these give the R&D programs more of a customer focus, increasing the
likelihood that research will be conducted with an end in mind, rather than simply for the
sake o f science. The lesson for ARPA is that, when establishing peer review panels, the
criteria by which those panels will evaluate R&D effectiveness must be carefully
considered.

"Good scientific quality" and interesting research are not acceptable

substitutes for revolutionary advances in the art o f war.

6 Though another problem could be created by hiring peers who work for the very
companies likely to compete for the resulting weapon systems
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Unfortunately, no studies exist which attempt to quantify ARPA's effectiveness at
funding technology, and the agency itself does not maintain the requisite data even to
attempt such a study. One ARPA official was able to provide such information as a list of
directors and the annual budgets over time, but more specific information was not
available, since the agency does not employ an historian, and has no procedure for
collecting key management data. In the absence of an existing comprehensive assessment,
and lacking the means to conduct such a study, an alternative is the analysis of unsolicited
opinions of those who have written about ARPA in the public forum. Purists will not
accept this as a real evaluation method, o f course, due to its lack o f scientific rigor, but
without any other workable approach, some value must be credited to the opinions of
experts and industry insiders. While ARPA has received praise from the press and from
defense experts, the existence o f admirers does not prove widespread respect.

A

reasonable proxy for the aggregate opinion o f the defense industry may be gleaned,
however, from a simple tally o f the positive and negative opinions expressed in a sample of
articles written about ARPA projects over the years. If, for instance, a thorough sampling
o f articles finds praise for a given project significantly more often than criticism, the
project might reasonably be considered a success.

Scouring the technical journals for

mention o f a given project and keeping a tally o f the results might not be the most
enjoyable o f tasks, but it would provide interesting data for further research. Over time,
after a significant number o f the projects have been assigned peer acceptance ratings, the
resulting database would either provide support for, or an argument against, claims that
the agency has been a model o f success. Obviously, such an approach lacks the scientific
rigor o f some other approaches, but it may be the best approach available at this time.
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These are just a few o f the techniques available for evaluating R&D impacts. Only
those most applicable to evaluating overall program effectiveness for an agency such as
ARPA are presented here.

A truly comprehensive evaluation, of course, is likely to

require evaluations of the individual projects. One interesting technique involves the use
o f case studies, with the objective of tracing the pattern o f events in the development of a
technology (Kingsley 1993). This technique would be most useful in evaluating ARPA's
role in a single innovation.

For instance, ARPA directors often boast of their agency's

role in the development o f stealth technology. In reality, however, radar cross section
(RCS) reduction techniques had been applied in the design of the Lockheed SR-71
Blackbird in the 1950s. Additionally, the ideas for the stealth technology incorporated
into the F-117 had been published by a Russian scientist prior to ARPA's involvement
(Rich and Janos 1994).

ARPA's role in stealth was basically limited to funding the

technology demonstration programs which led to the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), B2 bomber, and the F-117. To be sure, these were great technological accomplishments,
but the breakthrough innovations actually occurred much earlier. In fact, using the case
study method, one might be able to show that ARPA actually impeded the development of
stealth by declining to fund its early pioneers (Van Atta, Reed, and Deitchman 1991).
Provided enough data could be located, textual databases could be used, in theory,
to perform Co-Word analyses, and thereby trace research impacts. This is a technique
which has become more promising with the advancement o f computers and data-storage
devices (Kostoff 1993a). In the case of ARPA and its research, however, the required
data is too sparse. Because o f this factor, and due to the large amount of groundwork
required prior to engaging in Co-Word analysis, this technique will not be pursued here.
The researcher has a rather large selection o f evaluation methods from which to
choose. All have certain shortcomings, and are therefore likely to be indeterminate when
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used alone. Accordingly, "the greater the variety o f measures used to evaluate research
impact, the greater is the likelihood of converging to an accurate understanding o f the
knowledge produced by research" (KostofF 1993b, 164). Unfortunately, federal agencies
rarely use multiple techniques to evaluate their research, but instead choose to stick to a
single, favorite technique (KostofF 1993b). This circumstance may be due to the widelyheld opinion that in-depth evaluations o f R&D have not, to date, proven to be extremely
useful or reliable.

Until studies begin to reveal compelling justification for pursuing

aggressive R&D evaluation, the situation is not likely to change.

As a. result, making

judgments about agency success in funding research and comparing one agency to another
is often rather difficult and inconclusive.
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Chapter 3; History of ARPA
"I want an agency that makes sure no important thing remains undone because it doesn't
fit somebody's mission." - Secretary o f Defense Neil McElroy, 1958 (Gansler 1989, 238)
If American defense contractors were allowed to market their wares without
restriction on the world market, the federal government probably would have little need
for investing in defense R&D. Because o f the intense competition among governments to
field the most powerful militaries and the most sophisticated weapon systems, any
innovation resulting in a military advantage would be tremendously valuable to the
producer. Defense contractors would rush to invest in R&D and would compete for the
top scientists necessary to develop such innovations. For obvious reasons, o f course, the
U.S. government is not willing to allow American companies unrestricted access to the
world arms market.

As a result, defense contractors operate within a monopsonistic

market. They have, essentially, only one customer: the DOD. If they should develop a
new weapon system or pertinent innovation on their own, they would be at the mercy of
U.S. politicians to recoup their investment. Those elected officials might decide not to
allocate the funds to purchase the firm's product, no matter how innovative it may be. The
incentive to stay ahead in the international competition for military supremacy would not
be enough to ensure the sale, because those same politicians could prevent the product
from being sold to anyone else. Self-directed defense R&D is, therefore, extremely risky.7
This is the reason why the federal government must fund organizations like ARPA, the
Office o f Naval Research (ONR), and the National Research Laboratories.

7 Northrop learned this lesson the hard way when they developed the F-20 Tigershark without a
commitment by the Defense Department to buy the aircraft. Though the F-20 met the Air Force needs for
a lightweight, inexpensive, single-seat fighter, Northrop was left holding the bag.
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ARPA was founded in 1958, in response to the Soviet launching of Sputnik.
Separate from the three Service components, ARPA was to act as DOD's research arm
and invest in high-risk, potentially high-payoff technology.

In their 1991 report on

DARPA, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) divided the agency's history into 3
major periods (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991).

From its beginning in 1958

through the mid-1960s, ARPA enjoyed generous funding as it primarily concentrated on
several large projects to which it had been directed by the Executive Branch. Once those
programs became sufficiently mature to be transferred to other agencies, however, ARPA
took on a completely new look. Real funding levels declined in the second period, which
included the years from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s.

With the transfer o f the

"presidential issues," the agency gained the freedom to pursue projects of its own
choosing, but lost much o f its reason for being. The critical need for the agency became
less obvious, and some even pushed to end its charter. In spite o f this erosion of status,
however, the agency not only survived this uneasy period, but also produced some o f its
most important research in the area of computer science. The third period dates from the
mid-1970s to the present, and witnesses rising budgets as the agency takes on several
large high-risk projects, begins to indulge in programs seemingly outside o f its charter, and
is pulled in several new directions by politicians apparently intent on crafting industrial
policy through selective appropriation.
From the start, ARPA concentrated on several large "presidential issues:" space,
ballistic missile defense (BMD, the DEFENDER program), and nuclear test detection (the
VELA program).

These, after all, comprised the justification for forming the agency.

Even in the formative years, however, ARPA funded ground-breaking research in
computer science.

In 1961, the predecessor to the agency's Information Processing

Techniques Office (IPTO) was organized, and

J.C.R Licklider was hired as the first
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director. Licklider had worked with Leo Beranek on speech problems at Harvard during
World War II, and the two had later joined Richard Bolt and Robert Newman on the
faculty at MIT.

Those close ties continued when the group left MIT to form the

consulting firm of Bolt, Beranek, and Newman (BBN), a company which would become
ARPA's prime contractor in building ARPANET, the predecessor o f today's widelyrenowned Internet. The mission of the EPTO was to build "Centers o f Excellence" for
basic research in computer science that would improve military command, control, and
communications (C^).

The first years o f ARPA were a period of generous funding, since

the executive branch had high expectations for its chosen projects (Flamm 1987).
The mid-1960s through the mid-1970s marked a distinctly different period.
During these years, ARPA transferred the civilian space programs to NASA, and most
military space programs to the Services. It also transferred DEFENDER to the Army,
leaving VELA and the new AGILE program, which funded counter-insurgency R&D for
the war in Vietnam, as the only remaining "presidential" projects. These transfers marked
major transitions (DEFENDER alone had consumed 40-50 percent of the total budget
from 1965-67) and left significant holes in the fabric o f ARPA (Van Atta, Deitchman, and
Reed 1991). The program reductions did, however, provide the opportunity for a number
o f new exploratory research programs in such diverse areas as computer processing,
behavioral science, and advanced materials. With a 1965 computer research budget of
$14 million, which grew by 1973 to $39 million, ARPA (renamed DARPA in 1972)
funded research in such areas as computer graphics, display systems, interactive
computing and timesharing systems, and artificial intelligence (AI). In 1962, ARPA had
negotiated a large-scale contract for an MIT-based project with a timeshare focus. Project
MAC (Multiple Access Computer/Machine Aided Cognition) initially was funded at $2
million per year, with that amount increasing to $4.3 million in 1969 and remaining as high
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as $3 million in 1973. DARPA became the Defense Department's dominant source of
computer research and development in the 1970s, and led the world in its timesharing
research. According to Kenneth Flamm, "of 12 general-purpose timesharing systems
catalogued in a 1967 survey article, six . . . were sponsored by DARPA" (1987, 58).
The early research into timesharing systems laid the foundation for follow-on
research on networks and the establishment in 1969 o f ARPANET. For the initial study of
the basic concepts o f "packet-switched communications," DARPA had again turned to
MIT (Flamm 1987). Work on ARPANET began in 1966, when Robert Taylor, a former
director o f ARPA's computer research program and partner in Bolt, Beranek, and
Newman, asked the ARPA director for money to pursue the idea. Immediately, $1 million
was transferred into the ARPANET project, with BBN as the prime contractor. In 1968,
Taylor joined original IPTO Director Licklider in writing an influential paper suggesting
that computers could serve as communications devices, and envisioning a computer
network "that would create new communities o f scientists separated by geography but
united by technology" (Kantrowitz and Rogers 1994, 57).
Though overall funding levels from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s were fairly
constant in nominal terms (figure 1), inflation caused a steady decline in the real
purchasing power o f ARPA research budgets (figure 2).
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The declining real budgets were the result of uncertainty about the mission of the
agency, following completion of some of the "presidential" programs.

Some people

believed ARPA had served its purpose and no longer needed to exist. Fearing the agency
would become unfocused after completing its initial projects, Congress emphasized the
need for joint Service-ARPA programs and passed the 1972 Mansfield Amendment, which
further emphasized the importance of ARPA sticking to defense-specific research. In fact,
this emphasis was reflected in the addition of "Defense" to the agency's name in 1972,
creating DARPA (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991).
The third major period dates from the mid-1970s to the present, and involves large
projects in several high-risk areas, many of which were outgrowths of the earlier
exploratory research. Within the third period, three sub-periods also are apparent. From
1975 to 1977, DARPA, under the leadership of Dr. George Heilmeier, launched several
new large-scale demonstration projects, such as STEALTH, Space-based infrared
surveillance (TEAL RUBY), standoff follow-on forces attack (ASSAULT BREAKER),
and experimental aircraft (X-29, X-Wing).

In an effort to prevent these large-scale

programs from completely absorbing the agency's resources, Dr. Heilmeier separated them
into a separate office called the Experimental Evaluation of Major Innovative
Technologies (EEMIT). Dr. Robert Fossum became the DARPA Director in 1977, and
although he was concerned about all the technology demonstration projects launched by
his predecessor, he was stuck with them (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991).
In 1981, Dr. Robert Cooper took over as Director and, following the previous
pattern, began transferring many of the EEMIT programs (STEALTH, ASSAULT
BREAKER, TEAL RUBY, X-29) to the Services. He eliminated other, less promising
EEMIT programs.8 Simultaneously, the Strategic Technologies Office (STO), created in
8 No information is available concerning which projects were eliminated.
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the early 1970s to pursue several small, exploratory-research projects, was transferred to
the newly-formed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), along with several related EEMIT
projects.

In total, the programs transferred to SDI represented about 25 percent of

DARPA's budget. In place of these projects, DARPA launched several new aviation and
naval technology programs and gave birth to the Strategic Computing Program, an effort
to leverage computing advances into defense applications.

From 1986 to the present,

DARPA transferred several more key programs to other agencies, as Dr. Cooper
attempted to re-focus the agency on technology research, rather than system
demonstration.

Under Dr. Cooper's leadership, ARPA devoted funds to increased

research on undersea warfare and a new program, LIGHTSAT, to develop small satellites
for tactical Command, Control and Communications (C^). Meanwhile, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) introduced an entirely new focus, defense manufacturing, and
assigned DARPA several new "productivity-" oriented

programs,

such as the

semiconductor manufacturing consortium (SEMATECH), microwave/millimeter-wave
monolithic integrated circuit chips MIMIC, and Software Technology for Adaptable
Reliable Systems (STARS) (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed, 1991). Though justified as a
means o f reducing the cost o f future weapon systems, these programs were (and are)
extremely controversial, due to their weak fit with ARPA's mission and their striking
resemblance to de facto industrial policy/corporate welfare.
Continuing this trend o f expanding the role o f ARPA, in the Defense Conversion,
Reinvestment, and Transition Assistance Act o f 1993, the Clinton Administration
introduced the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP).

The TRP is managed by an

oversight committee called the Defense Technology Conversion Council, which consists
o f ARPA, the Department o f Energy/Defense Programs (DOE/DP), the Department of
Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),

the National
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Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). Demonstrating its admiration, the Administration selected ARPA to chair that
council. The goals o f TRP include softening the blow of the defense draw-down on small
businesses and reconsidering military specifications to allow cheaper, commerciallyavailable components to be used in weapon systems when possible.

While reasonable

arguments may be made in support of such an effort, the selection of ARPA to lead it
seems to demonstrate either a lack of understanding or a willful neglect of the agency's
strengths.
Historically, according to Agres, about half o f the ideas for DARPA-sponsored
research come from outside the agency, with the rest originating at DARPA. Research is
concentrated in several key areas, with about 10 percent o f the projects classified as basic
research.

Consistent with its roots, ARPA is still a major player in computer science

research.

In fact, as of 1989, ARPA supported the education of almost half o f the

American graduate students in computer science (Agres 1989, 40).9

9 This statistic probably does not hold true today. Though the 1994 Defense Appropriations Bill increased
funding for ARPA's Computing Systems and Communications Technology program by $426 million, it
also directed a $900 million cut in the program's university research funding.
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Chapter 4: Difficulties in Quantifying ARPA's Success
Though few can dispute the noted accomplishments o f ARPA, quantifying its
overall success is rather difficult, as explained in Chapter 2. The mission o f ARPA is to
fund advanced research with a potential for high payoff for the Department o f Defense, to
keep America's armed forces on the forefront o f technology. From that perspective, to the
extent ARPA can take credit for America's military preeminence, it has been quite
successful, at least in terms o f accomplishing its mission.
however, is more difficult.

Assessing

its efficiency,

Though many defense experts have credited ARPA as a

success in funding innovative technologies, they have failed to make the case that the
agency has done so in an efficient manner. How much, for instance, is stealth technology
worth to the United States? How many dollars worth o f security does that technology
provide? Without answers to such questions, we cannot assess definitively whether the
results o f research funded by ARPA warrant the costs o f funding the agency.
Perhaps due to the difficulty o f answering these questions, ARPA's supporters
often judge its success based on the commercial payoffs from its defense research.
Justifying the agency's existence solely by the value o f its research to the commercial
sector is, however, a risky approach. As Fortune writer Bruce Steinberg notes,
Military-industrial policy is not particularly efficient. Soldiers aside,
defense spending will create around 1.2 million jobs between now and
1987. But economists calculate that the same investment in the civilian
economy could produce roughly 25% more jobs (1984, 42).
The writer was arguing, not that government should invest in the civilian economy instead
o f in national defense, but that expenditures on defense should be based on national
security requirements, not on the potential economic benefits of those expenditures.
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Implied is the argument that government should leave economic investment to the private
sector, where risk and return considerations determine the allocation o f financial
resources.
Even ignoring the above argument, the approach o f quantifying ARPA's success by
the value o f its programs to the commercial sector is impractical, due to measurement
difficulties. One problem is that "programs that some have tagged as 'failures,' others
have seen as major accomplishments.

Some of the 'failures' may have had significant

influence elsewhere, while some 'successes' may have had little downstream effect" (Van
Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991,1-1,2).
Another problem is the difficulty o f determining what might have happened
without ARPA funding. This line o f reasoning gets into the idea o f premature industries.
A premature industry, according to University o f Chicago economist Robert Fogel (1960),
is one in which the public and private interests are not united. Investment in such an
industry comes from the public coffers because the private sector does not yet see the
opportunity for profitable investment, given the perceived level o f risk. By this definition,
the computer industry was a premature industry. Although the Department o f Defense,
through the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the National Security Agency (NSA)
funded most o f the early (through 1950s) research in computer science, and ARPA
continued the high level o f funding throughout the 1960s and 70s, that fact does not mean
the industry developed purely because o f government funding. All that is known is that,
as a result o f ARPA and other DOD agency funding, the computer industry developed

sooner than it otherwise would have. Certainly, the early years o f the computer industry
were dominated by the demands of the Defense Department. The private sector did not
yet see the value o f investing in this area, as is reflected by the fact that many o f the early
computer firms went out o f business when their government funding dried up (Flamm
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1987). Could this indicate that the industry developed at the expense o f other industries,
which could have benefited more from the research dollars? Critics of "big government"
think so. Unfortunately, an objective answer to that question is unlikely, due to the
number of assumptions which must be made prior to answering it.

Even without

government funding, however, most would agree the computer industry eventually would
have emerged.
The most extensive study o f the impacts o f ARPA's research was conducted by the
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), under DARPA contract. DARPA was approaching
its thirtieth anniversary and wanted to document the impact of its research in those first
thirty years. In this study, IDA collected all the information it could find on a list o f 55
ARPA projects.

The first two volumes o f the study contain histories of each of the

projects, while the third volume attempts to draw conclusions concerning the impact of
ARPA's research agenda. Overall, the study is very complimentary of ARPA's
accomplishments, though because o f its broad scope, no attempt is made to analyze the
efficiency of any of the projects.
A few sources of bias also are apparent. The first is due to the close relationship
' between ARPA and IDA. When ARPA was established, its original staff came directly
from IDA.

In the years following, ARPA worked directly with IDA on some o f its

projects.10 For IDA, therefore, to criticize ARPA, especially in its formative years, would
mean criticizing itself. The second source of bias is due simply to the stated purpose of
the study. DARPA paid IDA to document the impacts it had made over its first thirty
years, and to draw out recommendations for the future. Had IDA criticized DARPA too
strongly and minimized the impact o f its research, its report is unlikely to have been

10 Such as a 1984 basic technology program to deal with infrared signature reduction, and the ADA
common programming language development effort (Van Atta 1991, 10-6, 15-6).
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viewed as an acceptable product.

A third source o f possible bias is found in the project-

selection process employed by IDA:
The projects studied were selected by the IDA project team and DARPA
management working together, based on two criteria: (a) their importance,
judged on the basis of evidence in attestation and documentation; and (b)
the expected availability o f data. The data available would have to contain
sufficient information to permit elucidation o f DARPA's role and
contribution, tracing the paths of technical events through ultimate use,
assessment of the impact and spin-offs of the output, and clear enough
records to permit evaluation of lessons learned from the outcome (Reed
1990, 3).
Not only did the IDA researchers work with DARPA management to determine
which projects would be considered, but they even used as a baseline the project list
management had prepared on the occasion of DARPA's twenty-fifth anniversary
celebration. The two criteria mentioned above should have guaranteed that only the most
successful projects were selected, since they both would tend to make the baseline list
even more biased toward successful projects.

The first criterion, that the projects be

judged important, on the basis of documented evidence, biases the project list to the most
successful projects because they are the ones most likely to be publicized and considered
important. The second criterion, data availability, is understandable from the perspective
of the researchers, but is, nevertheless, equally biasing.

IDA had to rely on the data

provided by DARPA. The likelihood of the agency providing more data on its successes
than its failures only stands to reason.
To estimate the potential project-selection bias, please refer to Appendix A. This
appendix is the result of a project-by-project enumeration o f the amount of DARPA
investment in each, as reported in the IDA study. In the first volume and through about
half o f the second volume, the investment figures are provided in the summary section for
each project. About halfway through the second volume, however, the figures become

36

more difficult to identify.

For those projects missing investment figures, or with

incomplete figures, estimates are found in the column to the right of the investment
figures.

The far-right column in Appendix A notes any assumptions.

The study

documents about $3.7 billion in investment. Including several generous estimates, that
figure rises to about $5.2 billion. Comparing these numbers to the total DARPA budgets
from 1958 to 1988 (approximately $11.7 billion), the projects reviewed in the IDA study
represent between thirty-two and forty-four percent of DARPA's total budgets. Certainly,
these estimates leave ample room for project selection bias. Nevertheless, the study is
impressive in scope and may be quite useful as a starting point for follow-on analysis.
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Chapter 5: The Secrets of ARPA's Success
Whatever the truth about the agency's absolute measure o f success, anecdotal
evidence (i.e., the list o f successful projects the agency has funded, and the opinions of
noted defense and research experts) suggests that ARPA has been more successful at
funding technology than other government agencies.

Agres called DARPA a

governmental role model for funding technology and remarked, "in the corporate world,
they would be venture capitalists, and highly successful ones at that" (Agres 1989, 39).
According to the IDA study, ARPA's success has been made possible by eight primary
strengths (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991):
1. Small size in relation to the size o f its work programs
2. Flat organizational structure
3. Program managers (PMs) are empowered to make decisions and commit agency funds
4. Contracting is performed through the Services
5. Ability to access the entire U.S. technical community
6. Rotation of highly-qualified personnel
7. Ability to attract good people to manage its programs
8. Mix o f civilian and military staff
Another, less comprehensive study of the agency was conducted by Michael Davey
o f the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and identified a similar list o f factors
responsible for ARPA's success (1993):
1. Small staff
2. Flat organizational structure
3. Program managers are given the authority to fund or terminate projects
4. Two-thirds o f ARPA's contracts are administered by the Services
5. Ability to access the entire U.S. technical community
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6. Ability to make quick decisions to fund innovative ideas
7. Few rules and regulations
8. Usually funds a project only long enough to determine its feasibility
9. Large research budget
My own review o f the literature on ARPA led me to select eight readilyidentifiable factors which have led to ARPA's success: (1) funding research is job one, (2)
ARPA does not perform its own research, (3) small size o f the agency, (4) the rotation of
highly-qualified personnel, (5) dedication to a single customer: DOD, (6) authority to
focus on high-risk research, (7) freedom from micro management, and (8) concentration
o f resources on Centers o f Excellence.

1. Funding Research is Job One
According to its official mission statement (as o f 1991), ARPA exists to:
1. Pursue imaginative and innovative research and development projects
offering significant military utility.
2. Manage and direct the conduct o f basic and applied research and
development projects that exploit scientific breakthroughs and demonstrate
the feasibility o f revolutionary approaches for improved cost and
performance o f advanced technology for future applications (Van Atta,
Reed, and Deitchman 1991, V-3).
Funding research has been ARPA's only function over most of its existence. Other
agencies fund research "on the side," as an additional function. Traditionally, ARPA has
done nothing but fimd research. This setup has minimized distractions and allowed ARPA
to be very selective, concentrating on funding the best research possible.

As a result,

ARPA typically funds only about 5 percent o f the proposals submitted from outside the
agency, while other federal agencies fund 30-40 percent of proposed research projects.
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ARPA even has been able to avoid a significant amount of administrative overhead by
delegating two-thirds of its contract administration responsibilities to the Services (Davey
1993). As a result of this intense concentration on its narrow mission, ARPA has had the
opportunity to become quite proficient at spotting the research programs with the most
promise.

2. ARPA Does Not Perform Its Own Research
ARPA has no labs o f its own. The agency merely administers funds. It may fund
research at universities, at industrial laboratories, or at government laboratories.

As a

result, ARPA has the flexibility to fund the most promising research in the country,
without organizational or geographical bounds.

In contrast, other defense-related

research and development efforts take place within government laboratories. If those labs
wish to pursue research outside their areas o f expertise, they must either try to hire the top
researchers from the private sector (which is often difficult, given the compensation gap
between what industry or academia can offer and what government can offer), or attempt
to conduct the research with their own resources, which may not be sufficient.

3. Small Size
"Large hierarchical organizations tend to be remarkably efficient mechanisms for the
suppression of new ideas and alternatives." - Former Secretary o f Defense James
Schlesinger (Gansler 1989, 218)

Public Choice theory, explained in the Introduction, is equally applicable to the
behavior of politicians at the agency level. Although these government, officials generally
are not permitted to use their positions to enhance their own financial status, they are
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often quite amenable to serving their own self-interests in other ways.

One way is by

continually increasing their respective agencies' budgets and staffs, while simultaneously
expanding their roles and missions, thereby increasing the individual bureaucrat's sphere of
influence. This sort o f behavior, sometimes labeled "empire building," leads to layer upon
layer o f bureaucracy being added to organizations over time.

In contrast, ARPA has

maintained a very small staff, and operates in a relatively flat organizational structure
(figure 3).
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Thirty-seven years after its creation, the agency still employs less than 200 staff*
members, with about half o f them serving as program managers (Kitfield 1990). Each of
the program managers is responsible for a $10 to $50 million block of funds, with about
80 percent allocated for a single project or set of projects (Davey 1993). Although the
agency commands an impressive overall budget of about $1.5 billion, DARPA's combined
budgets from 1958 to 1990 still fell short of DOD's single year budget for research,
development, testing, and evaluation (Kitfield 1990). This relatively small size fosters low
overhead costs and limits bureaucracy. Asked whether DARPA could expand in size and
take on more responsibilities, controversial former director Craig Fields replied,

'"no,

DARPA can't get much larger in personnel and in budget and still be effective" (Agres
1989, 42). This is notable, considering the widely-held opinion that Fields lost his position
at ARPA due to his efforts to expand the agency's mission. Despite his zeal to get involved
in other areas, even he realized that the effectiveness o f his agency depended on it staying
sm all.
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4. Rotation of Highly-Qualified Personnel
"There is nothing more important... The technical people are solid.
They have
international reputations in their fields. Their personality is to be entrepreneurs." - Craig
Fields, Former Director, ARPA (Agres 1989, 42)

One plausible reason why ARPA directors have avoided the quest for power in
terms o f increasing staff and budgets is that few of them have stayed around long enough
to benefit from such power (see Table I). The phenomenon o f relatively short tenures is
true throughout the organization. Due to its prestige, ARPA is able to attract some o f the
brightest minds in the country, from industry, academia, and government, at the height of
their careers.

Most o f the engineers are in their 30s and 40s.

reduction in pay to work for the government agency.

Many even accept a

These employees have current

knowledge and fresh ideas for innovative research. They generally come to ARPA for an
average stay o f 3 to 5 years and then return to their previous employers (Agres 1989). As
explained in the IDA study:
DARPA has been seen as a place where one can see things done and make
things happen with a freedom that is rare in either government or industry.
In contrast, in academic research the freedom is there, but not the funding
and organizational wherewithal. Thus, DARPA has been highly attractive
for the technological entrepreneur with a strong vision and desire to
achieve (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991, V-7).
Because they do not stay long and because they are so intent on "getting things done,"
ARPA's employees do not have time to "build empires" and become entrenched in
bureaucracy.

Director

From

To

Years

Johnson, Roy N.

7 Feb 58

13 Nov 59

18

Betts, Austin W.

8 Dec 59

15 Jan 61

1.1

Ruina, Jack P.

16 Jan 61

5 Jul 63

2.5

Sproull, Robert L.

3 Sep 63

4 Jun 65

1.8

Herzfeld, Charles M.

6 Jun 65

30 May 67

2.0

Rechtin, Eberhardt

21 Nov 67

26 Dec 70

3.1

Lukasik, Stephen

11 Apr 71

17 Dec 74

3.7

Heilmeier, George H.

5 Mar 75

3 Dec 77

2.8

Fossum, Robert R.

4 Dec 77

5 Apr 81

3.3

Cooper, Robert

29 Jul 81

11 Jul 85

4.0

Duncan, Robert C.

18 Nov 85

21 Dec 87

2.1

Colladay, Raymond S.

31 Jan 88

28 Apr 89

1.2

Fields, Craig I.

1 May 89

6 May 90

1.0

Reis, Victor H. (acting)

7 May 90

12 Nov 90

0.5

Reis, Victor H.

13 Nov 90

3 Dec 91

1.1

Denman, Gary L. (acting)

4 Dec 91

14 Mar 92

0.3

Denman, Gary L.

15 Mar 92

3 Mar 95

3.0

Lynn, Larry (acting)
14 Mar 95
present
Table I: Tenures of ARPA Directors (Source: ARPA, unpublished)
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5. One Customer: DOD
ARPA has focused on a single customer, the Department o f Defense.

This

customer focus, along with the practice o f funding only that research which holds promise
for satisfying the needs of the Defense Department, is extremely important in explaining
the development o f the computer industry. Even before ARPA, the Defense Department
funded most o f the research in computer science. The reason for this funding was that the
military had identified very real needs for computers, such as calculating ballistic
trajectories in World War II. This kind o f involvement is very different from targeting
technologies. Government involvement in promoting the computer industry had nothing
to do with selecting a technology for the private sector or boosting American
competitiveness. Technology targeting, on the other hand, involves selecting technologies
or supporting scientific research in the hope that something useful might be produced for

someone. The idea that research aimed at solving identifiable problems is more likely to
be fruitful than research funded to produce something of potential use for a group of

unknown customers with unknown problems only stands to reason.
Another benefit o f the concentration on one customer is that it reduces the
difficulty o f selecting projects to fund. Other agencies, such as the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) must fund research without a
specific customer because they exist only to support scientific research.

To prioritize

numerous proposals, they must rely on the peer review system, by which a panel of
experts in the particular field judge the merit o f competing projects. One o f the criticisms
o f the peer review process is that it often stifles innovation (Friedman 1981). Research
which threatens currently-held beliefs may be seen as a threat by the panel members.
These reviewers, who are usually engaged in their own research, have a personal interest
in the outcome of the peer review process. ARPA does not have to worry about this
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problem because it makes its own decisions about which projects to fund, based on its
knowledge of its one and only customer. Though program managers at DARPA may use
peer review as a tool to help prioritize potential projects, the final decision is the
responsibility o f the program managers. The distinction is that ARPA, on the basis of
clear objectives, purchases its research.

Purchased research involves a quid pro quo

relationship, which leads to a mutually-beneficial exchange. Supported research does not
involve such a relationship, since the supporter is, in effect, a third party to the transaction,
and does not understand the needs of its undefined customer (Martino 1992).

6. Authority to Focus on High-Risk Research
ARPA traditionally has maintained a tightly-focused objective, to fund advanced
technology and thereby exploit technological opportunities which the rest of DOD has
overlooked. While other agencies may shy away from innovative research due to fear of
failure or the problems caused by the peer review process, ARPA's focus on high-risk,
advanced research

often

pushes

it toward

high-payoff,

innovative technology.

Undoubtedly, the agency has funded many failures along the way (though its directors
rarely talk about them), but it also has funded some spectacular successes. ARPA has
been allowed to accept some failures because uncertainty is the very nature o f research.
The research effort attempts to remove the veil of uncertainty to reveal whether or not any
opportunities for valuable development exist. ARPA is exposed to greater-than-normal
risks because it seeks out innovations capable o f revolutionizing the nature of warfare and
giving American forces a distinctive edge. In fact, ARPA is the only federal agency with
the mission of delving into such high-risk research (Agres 1989). Similar to financial
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investments, technological investments also require a high degree of risk to achieve
higher-than-normal returns.

7. Freedom From Micromanagement
"All DARPA does is fund research. But DARPA officials carefully select R&D projects,
and then they nurture them with ample funding and little bureaucratic intervention or
micromanagement" (Agres 1989, 39).

Traditionally, politicians have not interfered with ARPA's day-to-day operations.
One factor which has provided the agency this freedom from micromanagement is the
high-level of secrecy afforded many o f ARPA's research projects. In most governmentfunded research, bureaucracy is inevitable, because government must account for how
taxpayers' money is spent.

For this reason, federal funding usually results in a large

amount o f paperwork and micromanagement.

Another factor leading to this political

involvement is the fact that legislators have an incentive to associate their own names with
popular research so they may receive credit for that research (Martino 1992). Because
ARPA's projects are often so highly classified, few people outside the agency know what
projects are being funded, and are thus prevented from interfering. Indeed, former ARPA
director Robert Cooper comments, "DARPA probably has the largest pot o f unrestricted
money in the government or even in industry to [fund research]. That's where its power
lies" (Perry 1991, 65).
In addition to freedom from political micromanagement, Project Managers at
ARPA have great latitude within the organization to make final decisions about funding
and terminating projects. Working under very few rules and regulations, they have the
authority to award money very quickly to those ideas they believe are promising (Davey
1993).
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8. Concentration of Resources on Centers of Excellence
ARPA concentrates its resources on key areas in a few major research
organizations with proven capabilities.

This factor is closely related to the point

mentioned earlier, that ARPA does not perform its own research. The authority o f the
organization to focus its resources so tightly is also related to the situation mentioned
above, that the agency has remained relatively free from micromanagement. All too often,
in other areas of government appropriation, politicians threaten to prevent certain projects
from being pursued unless funds are allocated "equitably" across state lines and
congressional districts.

As a result, work is not always assigned to the most capable

organization, but is instead allocated on the basis of political influence.
Artificial Intelligence research provides an example of the difference in ARPA
funding procedures. ARPA always has been a major supporter of artificial intelligence. In
fact, it typically has supplied about 55% o f all government funding in this area. Even
while disbursing these large sums of research money, however, the agency has
concentrated its grants in a few major Centers o f Excellence: Bolt, Beranek and Newman
(BBN), Camegie-Mellon University, MIT, Stanford University, SRI International, and
Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center (Flamm 1987).
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Chapter 6: Dangerous Trends
Despite the past successes of ARPA, the agency's future effectiveness may be in
jeopardy. Shortly after the advent o f pork-barrel funding for science, Congress began to
look at ARPA as a new political playground.

Politicians, impressed by the apparent

success of the agency and, no doubt, by its sizable budget, began thinking o f new jobs for
ARPA.

As in the story about the goose that laid the golden eggs, the results o f this

tinkering are threatening the health of ARPA, and may bring an end to 37 years of
innovative research.

Mirroring some of the historical strengths o f the agency, several

important weaknesses are now identifiable.

1. Funding Research is Only One of the Jobs - The SEMATECH Case
The 1986 Discussion Paper by the Office o f the Comptroller General o f Canada
concerning evaluation of federal R&D established, among other things, "that quality of
research work, while necessary, is not a sufficient condition for federal R&D program
effectiveness, and that to be effective, quality research must be pursued in the context of a
clearly defined and relevant purpose" (Barbarie 1993, 157). This is significant because, in
addition to funding basic and applied research, ARPA, in its third period, has become
heavily involved in other activities, such as govemment-industry consortia, prototype
demonstrations, manufacturing methods, and manufacturing engineering education. This
shift has occurred, not by accident, but by design. Indeed, President Clinton released a
report in September 1992 which called for "reforming federal research and development
programs to focus on critical technologies," and "leveraging the existing federal
investment in technology to maximize its contribution to industrial performance" (Lee
1992, 59). The purpose of the agency no longer seems so "clearly defined and relevant"
as it once was.
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The consortiurr. o f Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology, SEMATECH,
became one o f ARPA’s most significant projects in the third period o f its history, and the
forerunner o f a new focus for the agency. As mentioned earlier, SEMATECH was
justified as a means o f reducing the cost of future weapon systems (Van Atta, Deitchman,
and Reed 1991). The real purpose o f this consortium, however, was no secret.

The

American semiconductor industry was in trouble in 1987. Less than 40 percent o f the
equipment used to make computer chips was being produced in America (Pope 1993b).
The original fourteen industrial members o f SEMATECH could have established the
consortium on their own, given that anti-trust laws had been relaxed (Steinberg 1984). If
government support was justified, then the government could have appropriated the funds
in the form o f a series o f grants or loans. The Chrysler Corporation bailout could have
been cited as a precedent for such an action. Instead, ARPA was forced to foot half the
bill for an industry-govemment consortium dedicated to propping up the American
semiconductor industry.

This project stands in stark contrast to previous DARPA

involvement in computer science research. When DOD funded key research in the early
years o f the computer industry, it was basically the only player. Almost no one else was
interested in using computers, so very little private-sector research money was available.
If DOD was to get the computers it needed, it was forced to pay for the research. Such
was not the case in 1987, and is not the case today. DOD, though admittedly a major
customer,11 now is only one o f many customers o f the computer industry.
Then DARPA director Craig Fields justified his agency’s involvement in
SEMATECH by pointing to the frightening possibility o f all the American computer chip
manufacturers going out o f business (Charles 1989). American weaponry is so reliant on
11 According to Charles, "The Pentagon buys more than $4 billion dollars worth of semiconductors each
year, about 27 percent of the industry's total U.S. production. Overall, electronics account for 36 percent
of the Pentagon's $38 billion R&D budget and 17 percent of the total defense budget" (1989).
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computers that our wartime effectiveness depends in large extent on the availability of
semiconductors. If the American semiconductor industry should fold, reasoned Fields, the
U.S. would be forced to rely on semiconductor shipments from Japan and other countries.
Not only would such extended supply lines be undesirable, due to the reduction in
timeliness, but the situation also would leave U.S. war-fighting capability vulnerable to
attacks on other countries or on the supply lines themselves. This scenario does warrant
some concern. Unfortunately, while the American government may have the noblest of
intentions, such intervention recalls similar attempts by the British to prop up their airline
industry.

They and others have failed miserably at resurrecting struggling industries.

Whether the government should have gotten involved in rescuing the American computer
chip industry is, at best, questionable. In any event, industrial safety nets are definitely
outside the purview o f ARPA.
The fact is, SEMATECH was not intended to solve critical national defense
problems with advanced research, but to prop up the American computer chip industry by
subsidizing the industry's R&D efforts. This fact was confirmed when the consortium's
chief executive, Robert Noyce, explained, "the first requirement of success is that it
(SEMATECH) be industry-driven. The industry spends far more time and effort thinking
about what needs to be done to promote its competitiveness than any other entity, so why
wouldn't you believe its conclusion?" (Charles 1989, 18).

Mr. Noyce is absolutely right.

The industry should decide for itself what needs to be done to improve its
competitiveness. That question should not be answered by the Defense Department. The
industry also should determine how much investment is appropriate to stimulate that
competitiveness and commit its own funds. Otherwise, the industry will not be able to
conduct a proper risk versus return analysis, and will have less incentive to succeed on its
own merits.
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Several of SEMATECH's original fourteen members became disillusioned with the
consortium and withdrew their membership during 1992 and 1993.

LSI Logic

Corporation announced its withdrawal in January 1992, citing a fundamental disagreement
about the direction of the consortium, and concerns that SEMATECH was not the best
place to invest its limited R&D dollars. LSI's disagreement was with the SEMATECH
practice of granting money directly to the companies which produce computer chip
manufacturing equipment.

SEMATECH supporters pointed to LSI's shaky financial

situation to minimize the significance of the withdrawal (Yamada 1992a), but could not
make the same argument a week later, when Micron Technology, Inc. announced that it
too was leaving SEMATECH.

Micron was doing well financially, but cited the same

concerns about the strategic direction o f SEMATECH.

A company spokesman said

Micron "had hoped the consortium would focus more on ways to make advanced chips"
(Yamada 1992b, A8) instead of funneling money into the pockets of the makers of
computer chip manufacturing equipment.

As Micron chairman and CEO Joseph

Parkinson explained, "Sematech has gotten off the track o f its original mission to develop
the production process" (ibid.).
Coincident with Micron's announcement, Harris Corporation had announced it,
too, was considering withdrawing from SEMATECH. A company spokesman at the time
noted that Harris intended to stay a member as long as the returns from its SEMATECH
membership justified the required investment (Yamada 1992b). A year later, in January of
1993, Harris Corporation announced that it had, indeed, withdrawn from SEMATECH
(Pope 1993a). Simultaneously, other members began pressing the consortium to "align its
research more closely with their own projects" (ibid.) instead of handing out their dues to
the equipment manufacturers.

In such a competitive industry, companies struggled to

justify giving their resources over to the consortium. In fact, SEMATECH had almost
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lost another member, Rockwell International Corporation, in 1992, because o f the poor
retum-on-investment performance statistics the company had generated. To prevent this
occurrence, SEMATECH had "launched an entire new research program to keep
Rockwell in the fold" (Pope 1992).
More bad news for SEMATECH arrived in an August 1992 Government
Accounting Office (GAO) report, which announced the decision by the Defense
Department to begin pulling its own money out of SEMATECH in 1993. Ten o f the
twelve SEMATECH members told the GAO they would not increase their own dues to
make up for the loss o f Defense funding. Though Craig Fields and other supporters o f the
consortium argued for the need to continue federal funding, the justification was hard to
find. American producers o f computer chip manufacturing equipment had experienced a
significant turnaround in the early 1990s. By early 1993, they controlled a 53 percent
share o f the world market, up from less than 40 percent in 1987 (Pope 1993b). Thus, the
true goal o f SEMATECH appeared to have been accomplished, and the consortium no
longer appeared to need the large federal subsidy.
Irrespective o f SEMATECH's need for the federal subsidy, in April 1993 it gained
a partial replacement for its former patron. The Energy Department announced, on April
7, a five-year agreement worth $103 million to help the consortium continue funding the
equipment manufacturers {Wall Street Journal 1993).

The following year, in October,

SEMATECH proudly announced a plan to "wean itself from its $90 million annual federal
appropriation" (McCartney 1994, B6). The plan called for removing DOD funding after
the 1997 fiscal year.

No mention was made of the status of the Energy Department

funding, though SEMATECH director Craig Barrett, who also served as chief operating
officer for Intel Corporation, announced, "The semiconductor industry is doing well,
making money, and can afford to pay its own way" (ibid.). Of course, Barrett did not say
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the consortium would pay its own way, only that it could afford to do so. Indeed, the
SEMATECH board stated its intention to replace the Defense Department funding by
competing for federal research grants. At the time of the announcement. Congress already
had approved the $90 million SEMATECH appropriation for fiscal year 1995 (ibid.).
In fiscal year 1996, a year scheduled to be the last in ARPA's sponsorship of
SEMATECH (Lynn 1995), the question remains, "was SEMATECH a success?" From a
retum-on-investment perspective, the anecdotal evidence appears disappointing. Several
o f the members withdrew from the consortium, others struggled to justify their
membership, and at least one was kept in only through the charity of a research program
designed to accomplish that end. This record is particularly dismal, considering the fact
that the companies put up only half of SEMATECH's funding. DOD covered half the cost
o f SEMATECH, yet the corporate members were able to appropriate returns on the total
investment. Admittedly, the American semiconductor industry did make a comeback, but
was that comeback the result o f SEMATECH or its leadership at ARPA?

Another

possible explanation is found simply in recalling the changing market conditions during the
relevant time period. The 1984-88 time frame played host to the Reagan defense buildup,
during which the American semiconductor industry was unable to keep up with overall
demand (Steinberg 1984). Because o f defense procurement regulations, only American
manufacturers were allowed to supply the demands o f the Defense Department, creating a
protected market and perhaps encouraging American companies to specialize in military
requirements. Because o f the size o f the overall American market for semiconductors,
Japanese manufacturers gained an opportunity to step in and supply the American
commercial market, siphoning away market share. While American companies focused on
the military customer, those Japanese companies may have been able to gain an advantage
in meeting the requirements of the commercial sector. Thus, once the defense drawdown
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began, American manufacturers may have found themselves at a competitive disadvantage.
The federal subsidy to SEMATECH may have bought the American manufacturers
enough time to regain their market share. If so, SEMATECH itself may actually have
been irrelevant. This is an area ripe for further study.
Even if SEMATECH can claim responsibility for resurrecting the American
semiconductor industry, the question remains, at what cost? What advanced research
programs did ARPA forego in order to fund and manage SEMATECH?

Again,

supporting America's semiconductor industry may be admirable and even justifiable from
the vantage point of preserving an industry important to national security and America's
economy, but it cannot be classified as advanced research. The unique capabilities of the
Advanced Research Projects Agency are, therefore, wasted on such efforts.

Other

government agencies are likely to be equally capable o f administering a subsidy. Those
other agencies are not, however, capable o f filling ARPA's role in selecting high-risk
research projects with a potential for revolutionizing the art o f war.
If predictions by Craig Fields hold true, and ARPA is not able to refocus its efforts
on advanced research for national defense, the agency may find itself involved in more
projects like SEMATECH in the future. In 1989, Fields predicted the agency would be
more active in the future in helping critical industries survive the threat o f foreign
competition (Charles 1989). Critical, in Fields's terms, is meant to imply not only those
industries critical to national security, but also those industries considered critical to
American economic growth. Indeed, the High Definition Television (HDTV) project was
another industry already targeted for DARPA aid at the time o f Mr. Fields's remarks.
Although several military uses for advanced/flat-panel displays have been identified, the
driving force behind DARPA's initial involvement was the perceived lead the Japanese
owned in this area (ibid.).
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ARPA's shift in direction did not occur without a struggle.

The Bush

Administration, opposed to the technology targeting idea, recognized the shift in DARPA
priorities and fired director Craig Fields, who had spent an unusually lengthy 16 years at
the agency. Surprisingly, one o f Fields's many supporters was George A. Keyworth, the
v

science advisor to President Reagan. Defending Fields, Keyworth expounded, "DARPA
and Fields's record is a string o f one brilliant idea after another" (Carey 1990, 31). Thus,
the ideological lines are not as clearly drawn as one might expect.

Though the Bush

Administration put up a valiant fight, Congress won out. As a result, the 1993 Defense
Conversion package included funds for such Congressionally-directed projects as the
"High Definition Display Manufacturing Consortia" and the Manufacturing Extension and
Manufacturing Engineering Education programs (Davey 1993).
Today, funding for flat-panel displays appears to be alive and well, in the form of
the High Definition Systems program, and ARPA continues to fund SEMATECH for yet
another year. Fortunately, statements before Congress by recent ARPA directors seem to
indicate that the High Definition Systems program has been directed toward meeting
military needs. As current ARPA director Larry Lynn explained before the Subcommittee
on National Security, House Appropriations Committee,
FY96 primary efforts are focused on the development and demonstration
of: power efficient displays for man-portable tactical information and
cockpit applications; compact, high-brightness, large screen displays for
command and control systems; and ultrahigh resolution displays for
intelligence applications. The head mounted display program will shrink
picture element size to allow over five million picture elements to be built
in one square inch and provide high quality information to mobile warriors
(1995).
Dr. Lynn identifies some exciting uses for high-definition systems which may very well
help the U.S. military forces gain a technological edge on their adversaries. Whether this
emphasis has come about as a result o f a leadership decision to focus on ARPA's
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traditional customer, or as a result of a smaller-than-expected commercial market is
unclear. Another possible explanation is that ARPA directors may be trying to appease a
Republican Congress which seems intent on cutting the size o f government while
preserving military capability.

If so, this would help explain the 1994 Clinton

Administration decision which directed ARPA to manage a $600 million program "to
develop a significant US manufacturing capability for flat panel displays" (Aviation Week
and Space Technology 1994, 80).

Whatever the driving force might have been, the

current program is, indeed, worthy of the advanced research label, and does hold promise
for military innovation.

The prospect o f ARPA again being tasked with administering

industrial policy in lieu of pursuing advanced research remains, however, a legitimate
concern.

2. Expanding Size
Why was ARPA ever saddled with a project like SEMATECH, which appears to
fall outside the agency's mission area? Senator JefFBingaman, D-N.M. explained candidly
that ARPA was the only agency with the available funds (Charles 1989).

Ideally, the

decision of who should manage a particular research project should consider agency
missions and strengths.

The decision should not be made on the basis o f available

budgetary resources. Senator Bingaman's explanation is only partial, however. The real
story goes back to legislation (S. 1233, 1987) introduced by Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, to
create a whole new agency within the Commerce Department to act as a civilian version o f
DARPA. Many politicians wanted to cash in on the success o f DARPA by duplicating it
in the civilian/industrial sector. The legislation failed because o f the cost and ideological
opposition by the Bush Administration. Supporters o f the idea did not, however, give up
the fight to have civilian technology funded. In the absence o f a civilian DARPA, they
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simply created a small civilian technology office within the Commerce Department called
the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) and simultaneously broadened the mission of
its defense counterpart (Davey 1993; Kitfield 1990).
Since 1986, ARPA has begun to receive more funds than its directors request.
From 1986 to 1990, for instance, DARPA's budget doubled, with the agency receiving
more funds than it requested in three o f those five years (this occurred, incidentally, during
a period in which DOD's budget declined, in real terms).

The significance of this

aberration is that 1) the agency is growing in size, and 2) the agency is losing its freedom
from micromanagement. Congress is pushing ARPA to fund dual-use technologies and
government/industry consortia by allocating more funds to those areas than its directors
request. In 1993, for instance, ARPA requested $10 million for high resolution display
research, and was allocated $100 million.

ARPA also received $581 million in

appropriations earmarked for civilian "conversion initiatives" which the agency did not
even request (Davey 1993). Congress, it appears, now has the responsibility for deciding
which initiatives ARPA will fund. It should come as no surprise, then, that politicians are
anxious to increase the agency's funding.

In the opinion o f former DARPA director

Robert Cooper (1982-84), these forays into non-defense areas can serve only to distract
ARPA from its critical primary mission:
In the case o f SEMATECH, Congress plunks a $200 million-plus
consortium in DARPA's lap, and tells the agency to manage it. Not only is
that a big project for an agency the size o f DARPA, but it is probably a
mismatch with the type of person who is a program manager there. They
tend to be venture capitalist types, looking for high risk, high payoff
technologies, rather than major project managers. And that trend will
change DARPA for the worse (Kitfield 1990, 26-28).
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3. Changing Composition of Personnel
One of ARPA's great strengths has been its high turnover rate.

While this

characteristic may not be envied in many other organizations, it has helped ARPA by
providing a continuous influx of highly-qualified scientists and engineers from the civilian
sector. Typically, these people come in with the latest knowledge and fresh ideas and only
stay long enough to oversee one major project. They bring a broad base of experience and
talent from academia, industry, and the military.
changed.

Recently, however, the situation has

More new scientists and engineers are arriving at ARPA from within

government. In 1993, the composition of the ARPA staff was 80 percent government and
20 percent industry, just the opposite of the ratio in the 1970s.
Compounding the problem o f having more people from inside the government and
less from industry, those from within government are staying at ARPA longer. Former
director Gary Denman expressed this concern in an address before the Subcommittee on
Defense, House Appropriations Committee:
I am also concerned that the tour o f duty for civil service program
managers at ARPA is increasing. In 1978, 75 percent of the civil service
program managers had been assigned to ARPA for less than four years,
and only four percent had been with the Agency for more than eight years.
Currently, 46 percent o f the ARPA program managers have less than four
years at the Agency and 19 percent have been in place for more than eight
years. This is an unfavorable trend. The more stringent ethics regulations
designed to close the revolving door between government and industry
contribute to this trend; however, there are other factors involved. The
recruitment of the best and brightest talent from industry is seriously
hindered by the current disparity in pay and the lengthy and unwieldy
government hiring process. This is particularly evident in attempting to
recruit for the senior-level ARPA Office Director positions (1994, 17).
As Dr. Denman mentions, the changing personnel composition is the result o f three
primary causes. First, the salary differential between inside and outside the government
has grown larger, increasing the penalty for the top people to serve a tour at ARPA.
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Second, the government hiring process deters good people from applying. Dr. Denman,
however, seems to minimize the importance of what I believe may be the most significant
factor: the federal government's new "revolving door" legislation. These ethics regulations
are intended to prevent people from profiting in the private sector from their government
service. On the surface, the regulations seem reasonable. After all, who wants to see
government employees profiting from their public positions?

The unintended effect,

however, is to keep ARPA from the full talent pool.
ARPA has a long history o f rather entangled relationships with private-sector
organizations.

The personnel shuffle among ARPA, MIT, and Bolt, Beranek, and

Newman is an obvious example. Did Robert Taylor, the former director of the agency's
computer research program, act inappropriately when he asked his old friends at ARPA
for money to build the first computer network? Was ARPA wrong for selecting BBN as a
key contractor on the ARPANET project?

Such relationships probably would not be

allowed today, due to the mere appearance o f impropriety, but they were essential to the
success o f the network, because they implemented the best talent in the country. In the
past, civilian scientists may have been willing to accept a pay cut to work at ARPA if they
believed the tour would enhance their careers. If, however, civilian scientists fear taking a
position at ARPA will mark the end of their private-sector careers, the prestige o f serving
in the agency is bound to suffer. This problem, therefore, is not likely to be solved simply
by increasing program managers' pay.
Another change which may be relevant is the shift in the military-to-civilian ratio
on the ARPA staff. As shown in Figures 5 and 6, the military presence on the ARPA staff
has declined steadily over the 37 years since the agency's inception.
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This is disturbing because the military/civilian mix was one of the strengths IDA identified
in Volume 3 of their study:
The presence o f military professionals on the DARPA staff has helped
DARPA's understanding of Service problems associated with the program
and of the context into which the output would fall, and with later Service
acceptance of the programs (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991, V-10).
To the extent that the reduction in the military presence reduces the understanding
of Service problems and impacts Service acceptance of ARPA programs, the agency's
success rate (in terms of funding military innovations) may be expected to suffer. The
next danger is closely related to the changing composition of personnel, and may be
considered the reason for it.

4. Loss of Customer Focus

r

Many judge ARPA's success on the basis of the large number of commercial "spin
offs" the agency has spawned. This is ironic because the spin-offs have occurred in spite
o f the agency's focus on military research.

If ARPA can create so many commercial

successes by accident, many reason, it could create many more by directly funding
commercial research. Such ideas have received even more attention since the end o f the
Cold War. Adding to this sentiment is a report by the Council on Competitiveness, a blueribbon panel of industry and academic leaders, which warned in 1991 that America was
losing its technological edge in the global marketplace.

The report placed significant

blame for this perceived technological decline on excessive defense spending (Perry 1991).
Combined with the public's increased sensitivity to the size of the nation's budget deficit,
these factors have made Congress less willing to invest in research aimed solely at
defense-related objectives.

They instead have become increasingly more interested in

funding "dual-use technologies;" that is, research targeted toward both the military and
commercial sectors.
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Many in Congress have grown impatient with waiting for spin-offs, and now
believe more commercially-viable technologies may be generated by skipping the
middleman (i.e., the defense sector) and directly targeting the various commercial
industries. This new focus is reflected in the recent name change from DARPA to ARPA.
Dropping "Defense” from the agency's name is meant to indicate a broader mission for the
agency.

In fact, the 1993 Defense Authorization bill required ARPA to "pursue

imaginative and innovative research and development projects having . . . both military and
commercial (dual-use) applications" (Davey 1993, 7).

Jacques Gansler, in Affording

Defense, defended the dual-use idea, explaining that "shifting the focus o f defense R&D
toward 'dual-use' technologies is not meant to replace private-sector funding o f non
defense R&D; it is meant to complement it" (1989, 236).

Unfortunately, this change

necessarily leads to a diluted focus and a dissolution o f the supplier-customer relationship.
If ARPA is to fund research beneficial to everyone, how can it focus on anyone? How
will it select which projects to fund without more definite objectives? DARPA knew its
customer. Can ARPA ever know the needs of the amorphous private sector?
In 1993, President Clinton launched the multi-agency "Technology Reinvestment
Program" for the purpose o f fostering new dual-use technologies, simplifying the defense
acquisition process, and easing the burden o f the defense drawdown. If the project can
achieve these goals, the benefit is expected to be in the form o f a closer relationship
between government and industrial research and development. This development ideally
would lead to innovations useful to both the commercial and military sectors, and would
help to hold down the cost o f defense acquisitions. Teaming ARPA, the Department of
Commerce's National Institute o f Standards and Technology (NIST), the Department of
Energy, Department o f Transportation, National Science Foundation (NSF), and NASA,
the Technology Reinvestment Program is headed by ARPA.

Again, the goals are
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laudable, and the program may prove worthwhile. The problem is that the Administration
gave ARPA responsibility for directing the new project.
ARPA is well-suited for funding high-risk research to expand the envelope of
defense technology.

It is not, however, in any position to pass judgment about the

commercial value of a technology or to rewrite the Defense Department's labyrinthine
procurement regulations.

With the federal government offering to pay for up to 50

percent o f the cost o f research selected by the Technology Reinvestment Program,
proposals for funding are plentiful.

Unfortunately, only a small percentage of the

proposals can be funded, given the program's limited budget.

Somehow, then, the

government agencies must decide which companies and which industries will receive
government funding and which will not. The danger, o f course, is that such decisions will
be made on the basis o f political influences. Recognizing this unseemly situation, Sen.
John McCain (R-AZ) told Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry, "We know there is
intense competition for those funds. We would like to be assured that the funds are given
on the basis of merit and not political influence" (Gregory 1993, 52).
Another concern is the issue of foreign participation in Clinton's defense
conversion program. Most would agree that federal tax dollars should not go to foreign
companies. Avoiding that outcome, however, is more difficult than many might imagine.
In an increasingly global economy, a large number of successful companies are neither
strictly American nor foreign, but are instead Multinational Corporations (MNC). Should
American tax dollars assist companies with divisions in more than one country? ARPA's
answer, responding to a nervous Congress, is "no." Funds will be restricted to companies
with a "significant level o f [their] research, development, engineering and manufacturing
activities in the United States" (Gregory 1993, 53). Will that policy exclude the most
successful companies, in favor o f those that have not been able to expand globally? If so,
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is ARPA not acting to circumvent market forces and prop up the relative failures?

In

effect, then, ARPA has taken on the role of a corporate welfare administrator. Somehow,
that does not seem to fit in with President Eisenhower's original vision for the agency.
Considering the above concerns, one might question the justification for ARPA
involvement in funding research to benefit the private sector. While military R&D may be
justified on the basis of national defense being a public good, what is the rationale for
funding commercial R&D with public money? Private companies fund research based on
risk and expected returns. If risk is considered too great relative to expected returns for a
private company to invest its own money, what is the rationale for the government taking
money from its citizens to make such an investment? How can a government agency
determine whether or not the private sector has under-invested in a particular technology?
A broader focus also may present the opportunity for Congress to get more involved in
selecting which projects will be funded. Many o f DARPAs projects were highly classified,
and therefore free of public scrutiny. ARPA will not have such a luxury when funding
commercial research.

Future research grants may well follow the example o f the

Department o f Agriculture and be spread out equally among congressional districts.
Alternatively, research funds may be allocated to certain geographical areas to appease
powerful members o f Congress, or purchase key votes on other legislation. Individual
industries also will have a stake in how the funds are invested.

As a result, lobbyists are

likely to fight for equitable distribution o f the research grants among industries. The net
result could be to extinguish the flame o f innovation at ARP A.
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5. Increase in Micromanagement
Perhaps in response to criticism by the Council on Competitiveness, the Deputy
Secretary o f Defense decided in 1992 to require the Director o f Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E) to certify annually that DOD research funds (including those
controlled by ARPA) are allocated optimally (Davey 1993). Will this requirement result in
pressure on ARPA to avoid the high-risk research that has been the agency's hallmark?
Undeniably, the answer is yes. In fact, the Institute for Defense Analyses evaluation found
evidence that, even before the Council on Competitiveness report, ARPA operations were
becoming increasingly restrictive:
We emphasize that DARPA has generally managed its programs very
effectively. It is critical that extreme care be taken in any efforts to
"improve" management control within DARPA or over DARPA. It is
important to avoid saddling DARPA with restrictive management controls
and procurement procedures to "ensure" no mistakes are made, that it
becomes too encumbered to provide its essential and fundamentally
different type o f R&D support for DOD. Over time DARPA has become
increasingly restricted by processes and procedures in conformance with
more standard contracting organizations (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed
1991, V-9).
The source o f this phenomenon also can be traced to mandated programs outside
the realm o f "high-risk, high-pay off advanced R&D," because those programs require
management and procurement procedures not suited to ARPA's primary role (Van Atta,
Deitchman, and Reed 1991). The agency has become overly burdened in recent years
with mandated programs in such areas as prototyping and improving manufacturing
technology, which are not the advanced form o f research for which ARPA was founded.
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6. Resources Distributed Geographically: The TRP Case
It is the mission o f the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) to
stimulate the transition to a growing, integrated, national industrial
capability which provides the most advanced, affordable, military systems
and the most competitive commercial products. TRP programs are
structured to expand high quality employment opportunities in commercial
and dual-use United States industries and demonstrably enhance U.S.
competitiveness. This will be accomplished through the application of
defense and commercial resources to develop dual-use technologies,
manufacturing and technology assistance to small firms, and education and
training programs that enhance U.S. manufacturing skills and target
displaced defense industry workers (ARPA 1993, 1-1).
While ARPA once focused its resources on a few Centers o f Excellence, the
Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP), started in 1993, provides an example o f ARPA
distributing its funds geographically, in a politically-acceptable fashion. Not only are the
funds distributed throughout the country, but a portion o f the funds are set aside for small
businesses, through the Small Business Innovative Research Program. In this program,
leadership in the field o f research is less important than being a small company (i.e., less
than 500 employees). In fact, should a small company be judged to "dominate” the field in
which it submits a research project, that company will be disqualified (ARPA 1993)!
Apparently, the idea o f funding the best research is no longer paramount.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
The present study has provided an informal review o f the literature useful in
planning evaluations o f the Advanced Research Projects Agency. It has suggested a few
ideas for conducting evaluations of the individual projects, and has identified a plausible
list o f factors which have enabled ARPA to achieve the degree o f success with which it is
so often credited. Along with those positive factors, the review has identified six trends
which may be threatening the future o f the agency.
ARPA has funded many innovative research projects over the past thirty-seven
years, and has developed a loyal following o f admirers. Still, in thirty-seven years, only
one comprehensive evaluation has been performed, and that was funded under ARPA
contract and did not include any detailed analysis. Beginning with an agenda of large,
high-risk presidential issues, ARPA's advanced research efforts are now intermingled with
managing government-industry consortia and doling out money to displaced defense
workers and small businesses. The agency is at a cross-roads in its history and may have
lost its clear direction. In-depth analysis is long overdue, and should help the agency to
capitalize on its prior strengths to ensure a bright future.

Such evaluations will be

especially challenging, due to the difficulty in obtaining necessary data, but need to be
started.
Patent citation analysis may offer some promise as an evaluation tool, provided the
researcher can find the identification numbers o f patents generated by ARPA. Finding
these identification numbers is likely to be a very difficult task, however. The researcher
may have more success in searching on-line databases o f journal abstracts to assess the
opinions o f experts regarding particular areas o f ARPA-funded research.

This would

provide a test o f the assertion that ARPA is highly-respected in the scientific community.
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The most promising technique for future research efforts involves the use o f casestudies. This approach may be useful in evaluating ARPA's contribution to key
technological innovations. As mentioned earlier,12 ARPA's role in stealth technology may
not be as significant as the agency claims, since much o f the actual research was
performed outside o f ARPA's purview and prior to the agency's involvement.
studies o f other ARPA programs may reveal similar findings.

Case

Performed for several

programs at various points in time, the case study approach also might reveal whether
ARPA's impact has changed over the years.
The factors identified in Chapter 5 seem to be responsible, to some degree, for
ARPA's apparent success in funding research.

A thorough test of this hypothesis,

however, will require a similar evaluation o f other "peer" agencies, such as the National
Institutes o f Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Naval Research Laboratory.
Only when such evaluations are accomplished, and comparisons can be performed, will the
evidence be sufficient to determine conclusively which characteristics lead to efficiency in
funding successful research.

12 See page 22.
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Appendix A: Approximate ARPA Investments, through 1988, in
Projects Selected by IDA
PROGRAM

PROJECT

ARPA INVESTMENT
($Millions)+estimates
SPACE
ARGUS
9
TIROS
14
TRANSIT
52
CENTAUR
22
SATURN
101.5
DEFENDER (ABM) ESAR
45
TABSTONE
18
HE LASERS
1000
OTH RADAR
100
AMOS
102
PRESS
200
ARECIBO
19
HIBEX
25
UPSTAGE
26
PENAIDS
25
VELA (NUC. MON.) VELA HOTEL
150
V. UNIFORM
9
LASA
45
NORSAR
8
AGILE
AR-15/M-16
0.5
0.1
CAMP SENTINEL
7
X-26B-QT-2
0.25
POCKET VETO
12
INF. PROCESSING ILLIACIV
59
Project MAC
25
ARPANET
25
Al
120
130
Morse Code Reader
2
ACCAT
15.7
LAMBDA
12
36
SLCSAT
150
Interact. Comp. Graphics
0
100
Image Understanding
72
ADA
0
5
SIMNET
32.1
VLSI
0
100

TACTICAL TECH.

SURVEILLANCE
AVIATION TECH
NAVAL TECH
MATERIALS

TOTAL

MOSIS
TANK BREAKER
HIMAGfHSVT-L
MINI-RPVs
ASSAULT BREAKER
PAVE MOVE R/TAWDS
BETA
CELT
ARMOR/ANTI-ARMOR
TEAL RUBY/HICAMP
STEALTH
X-29
ARC
Digital Gallium Arsenide
IDLs
F-100 Engine RFC

54
35
47
15
155
50
9
11
100
354
0
126.85
64
5.5
158
13
3700.4

100
1000

14.5

COMMENTS

p3-8 (vol 1) says 28M and 24M for a total of 42M

ESAR construction and testing, plus phased array technology program
750M for lasers, plus about $250M for space mirrors work
initial cost: $12M; cost of later phases = $90M (10-9, v1)

plus expense of field office in Vietnam (est. $100K)

$6M direct cost, plus $6 M for predecessor programs
$31M development cost, plus $28M for "shakedown and utilization"

Up to Strategic Computing Program (est. additional $130M)

Not including MFA, FME, or OMAT (est. $12M each)
No figure provided (est. $100M)
Through 1988
No figure provided - ARPA played a mqt role (est. $5M)
15% of $214M total
No figure provided; MOSIS said to be low-cost because it was able
To leveraqe the VLSI investment (18-32, vol 2). Est. $100M
Facility and staff: $30M; Proj. support: $24M (18-24, vol 2)

Up to 1985 (est. $100M afterward)
24M initial, 100M overrun, 230M1982 baseline addl funds
No estimate provided- cited security concerns. Guess $1B
AO 3436:8.85M. AQ4188:118M
1977 Rockwell effort: $5.5M; no figures for later programs. Est. $20M total

$7M direct costs, plus $6M for related work
1485.6 These projects represent up to $5.19 Billion of ARPA's 1958-88 budgets
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Appendix B: The AIDS Patent Project Search Engine
The search engine used for the AIDS Patent Project13 is the same tool which will be used
for the new system to be introduced by the USPTO on 9 November, 1995. This system
will allow access to over twenty years of bibliographic text data from the front pages of
patent applications.
The AIDS Patent Project has two search tools, one a free text search, and the other a twofield boolean search. The free text search tool is available on the AIDS Patents Search
Page, http://patents.cnidr.org/pto/search.html, and consists o f a form resembling the
following:

Enter terms to find: _______________
Search on field:_______________
{Options: Full Text, Patent Number, Title, Abstract, Inventor Name, Assignee Name,
Claims, Original Classification}
Enter terms to de-emphasize:_______________
Search on field:_______________ {Options same as above}
The second tool is available on the AIDS Patents Boolean Search Page,
http://patents.cnidr.org/pto/bool.html, and consists o f a form resembling the following:

Enter first term :_______________
Search on Field:

{Options: Full Text, Patent Number, Title, Abstract, Inventor Name, Assignee Name,
Claims, Original Classification}
Boolean operator;_______________ {Options: and, or, andnot}
Enter second term :_______________
Search on Field._______________ {Options same as first field}

13 Home Page http://patents.cnidr.org/welcome.html
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Appendix C: ARP A Staff Size bv Year
Year Civilian
1963 109
1964 125
1965 149
1966 148
1967 153
1968 147
1969 136
1970 128
1971 122
1972 126
1973 118
1974 118
1975 120
1976 120
1977 113
1978 108
1979 117
Table [I: ARP A

Military
60
65
61
57
54
58
61
60
59
59
55
43
33
33
32
30
29
Staff Size,

Year
Civilian Military
Total
29
169
1980
121
29
190
123
1981
29
210
123
1982
32
205
131
1983
1984
130
30
207
25
205
1985
125
26
197
1986
125
26
188
1987
139
26
181
1988
130
185
145
28
1989
27
1990
145
173
26
161
1991
140
24
153
145
1992
24
153
158
1993
24
1994
145
152
24
138
158
1995
146
by Year (Source: A]RPA, unpublished)

Total
150
152
152
163
160
150
151
165
156
173
172
166
169
182
176
182
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Glossary
AGILE
AI
ARPA
ASSAULT BREAKER
BBN
BMD
C3
DARPA
DEFENDER
DOD
DOE
EEMIT
IDA
IPTO
IRR
LIGHTSAT
MAC
MNC
MIMIC
MIT
NASA
NASP
NIH
NIST
NRL
NSF
ONR
PM
R&D
SBIR
SCP
SDI
SEMATECH
STARS
STO
TCP/IP
TEAL RUBY
TRP
USD A
USPTO
VELA

Vietnam-era counterinsurgency R&D program
Artificial Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Agency
Standoff follow-on forces attack program
Bolt, Beranek, and Newman
Ballistic Missile Defense
Command, Control, and Communications
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Ballistic missile defense program
Department o f Defense
Department o f Energy
Experimental Evaluation o f Major Innovative Technologies
Institute for Defense Analyses
Information Processing Techniques Office
Internal Rate o f Return
Program to develop small satellites for tactical C3
Multiple Access Computer / Machine Aided Cognition
Multinational Corporation
Microwave/millimeter-wave monolithic integrated circuit chips
Massachusetts Institute o f Technology
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Aerospace Plane
National Institutes o f Health
National Institute o f Standards and Technology
Naval Research Laboratory
National Science Foundation
Office o f Naval Research
Program Manager or Project Manager
Research and Development
Small Business Innovative Research Program
Strategic Computing Program
Strategic Defense Initiative
The Consortium of Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology
Software Technology for Adaptable Reliable Systems
Strategic Technologies Office
Transfer Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
Space-based infrared surveillance program
Technology Reinvestment Program
U.S. Department of Agriculture
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Nuclear test detection program
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